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SUSTAINABILITY, MORALITY AND 
FUTURE RIGHTS 
Keith Abney 
In moral theory, sustainability is understood as a meeting of environmental and inter­
generational ethics-the intersection of responsibilities to the environment, our current 
selves, and to future persons. There are four primary ethical approaches to sustainabil­
ity: rights theory, Kantian deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. Only one-virtue 
ethics-offers the promise of a coherent and fertile understanding of the complex issues 
involved. To see why, the nature of rights and the nature of our duties towards the future 
require explication. Neither nonsensically reified rights of future beings nor utilitarian 
calculi accurately analyze such moral duties; instead, virtue ethics does so, by specifying 
the necessary conditions for collectively and indefinitely sustainable human flourish­
ing-with special attention to the ecosystems such flourishing requires. 
1. Rights theory: problems of its use for sustainability 
The concept of a moral person-one due moral consideration, a being capable of moral­
ity-is often confused and conflated with genetic humanity, but a moment's reflection on 
the status of corpses or possible extraterrestrials (Mr. Spock, say) shows such 'speciesist' 
understandings cannot be correct. To clarify the concept of a moral person, we first need 
to understand the nature of moral 'rights'-they are entitlements (being entitled to cer­
tain considerations and/or freedoms), which in themselves place me under no obliga­
tion. Rather, a right grants me a liberty-I may claim it, if I so choose; but I am under no 
compunction to make the claim-it is up to me. So freedom or liberty is built into the 
concept of 'a right'. My right to free speech does not require me to speak-it instead sim-
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ply means that I may speak, if I so choose-regardless of what others wish. (Of course, 
that doesn't mean they have to listen!) 
But rights claims I make do 10gicaJly entail responsibilities-not for me, but for other 
persons. So, the correlativity thesis: any ascription of rights to oneself involves correla­
tive obligations for others. If I am free to speak, then, at a minimum, you have an obli­
gation not to shut me up. My'right' is hence a freedom to avoid being interfered with-it 
constitutes a restriction on the ability of others to thwart my freedom. Such 'negative 
rights' require merely autonomy for oneself and non-interference by others. Some rights 
theorists also assert the existence of'positive rights, which impose even stronger obliga­
tions upon others-they are required to assist me (if I so choose) in the exercise of my 
right. (Federal 'equal time' laws for campaign advertising are understood as a positive 
right-they require the assistance of the media to be exercised.) It follows that rights 
claims logically require autonomy, the ability to be a law unto oneself, which requires 
the capacity for the rational exercise of free will, or agency; and rights, as seen, also 
require moral responsibilities, on each other person whenever I claim a right. So with­
out autonomy, one cannot have rights; without rights to be free from some interference 
in at least some parts of life, autonomy is impossible. 
Of course, the correlativity thesis applies to all rights claims-not just my own. So if 
anyone else has a right, I am under a correlative obligation; the only scenario under 
which I have rights but no responsibilities is if no one else has rights at all-except me. 
Likewise, in the absence of culpability-assignations of moral responsibility-claims of 
rights are a mirage; I have no rights if others do not thereby have obligations to respect 
those rights. In slogan form, 'No rights without responsibilities-per the correlativity 
thesis, universal rights entail universal responsibilities/duties. There is a related slogan 
form for compensatory justice: 'No right without a remedy'-a social right only exists 
insofar as social means for compensatory justice exist. If my rights can be violated with 
impunity, they do not really exist. 
With all this in mind, the diagnosis of what ails rights discourse is enabled. In rights 
theory, moral persons are all and only those capable ofmoral responsibility. Given the cor­
relativity thesis, there are no rights without responsibilities; that is, every ascription of a 
right to one involves correlative obligations for all other ... persons. Not everything has 
obligations-lions, giraffes, tables and chairs have no obligations to respect my right to 
free speech. That's because they are incapable of it-they cannot be morally responsible, 
hence are simply not a person. Now, mind you, the converse of the cor'relativity thesis 
does not hold-obligations can exist for persons without some person thereby being given a 
right. You and I arrive simultaneously at a four-way traffic stop; we are both obligated 
to stop, but neither of us has a 'right' to go first. Or-to address sustainability-we persons 
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may well have duties to the environment or future generations, without those things 
thereby having moral rights. 
So the essential problem occurs because those who confuse morality with legalism or 
due process often also confuse moral consideration with moral rights. The defenders of 
animal rights, environmental rights, fetal rights, and so forth are trapped in moral dis­
course that disguises their true concerns and legitimate claims because their theoretical 
vocabulary embodies a deep incoherence. Simply put, animals, fetuses, and the envi­
ronment have no rights. They cannot have rights, because they can neither exercise 
agency, nor undertake obligations-they are not held responsible for what they do. And 
as seen, rights claims logically require both autonomy (for the bearer of rights) and 
autonomous responsibility (for all those who recognize a right). Non-human animals 
(as far as we know) can neither rationally exercise free will nor bear responsibility for 
infringing on the rights of others-hence they cannot be bearers of or respecters of 
rights. Non-human animals can neither make rational claims nor be tried for their fail­
ures to respect the claims of others. My cat or dog, whatever their other abilities, do not 
have the capacity for autonomy or taking responsibility-and hence logically cannot have 
rights. If animals such as dolphins or bonobos eventually do demonstrate such abilities, 
then they would be considered rights bearers-and correlatively, citizens of the moral 
community with obligations to us. In short, they would be persons. I have encountered 
no convincing evidence of such abilities by them, so henceforth I assume they have no 
rights. Occasionally legal fictions are created that ascribe rights to things without auton­
omy-a recenl suit was filed on behalf of cetaceans against the US Navy, claiming that 
whales and dolphins 'have a right' not to have noise pollution from submarines endan­
ger their health. But of course, in reality the cetaceans were not making the claim-a 
human was, in effect asserting his right to save the whales. (By the way, the case was dis­
missed.) 
Similarly, fetuses-and infants, for that matter-cannot have moral rights. They too 
can neither exercise agency nor undertake obligations. And likewise for 'the environ­
ment', or any other mistakenly reified rights holder. But of course, no one likely believes 
that the fact that infants and pets have no rights means that morally we may do as we 
like with them. That is, the moral community-the set of things to which moral consid­
eration is due-is certainly larger than the set of rights holders-those who can rational­
ly demand such consideration as a right, and hence as my obligation. And it is the 
tendency to conflate 'having a moral right' with 'being due moral consideration' that has 
poisoned intellectual discourse on these topics and created such ethical confusion. Stem 
cells, pets, ecosystems, zygotes, fetuses, infants, and research animals all plausibly are 
due varying degrees of moral consideration-but not because they have any rights. 
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A Kantian holds that they are due consideration merely instrumentally, because 
rights holders care about them-as is clear with the treatment of pets versus other ani­
mals. Their value, says Kant, is merely instrumental: because some rational agents care 
about Fluffy, it is wrong to harm Fluffy-but the harm is not directly to Fluffy, but indi­
rectly to the agent, the holder of rights. Kant thought it wrong to torture dogs or cats, 
not because of the harm to the dog-there is none-but because of the harm to the per­
sons who care about the dog (and the harm to the torturer himself). Some seriously 
believe that such an analysis can be extended to explain all moral consideration-that is, 
non-rights holders are due moral consideration only insofar as rights holders care about 
them-or insofar as they affect the interests of rights holders. 
But I think it obvious that such an approach cannot succeed; it requires radical revi­
sion and supplementation, as the discussion below will demonstrate. Its remnant plau­
sibility rests on the fundamental confusion about who can and cannot have rights, 
which both law and Kantian moral theory have continually obfuscated. This is especial­
ly clear when discussing 'potential persons'-things that are not persons now, but (if all 
goes well) can become persons at some later time. A fetus is obviously such a potential 
person, but so are the later generations that sustainability theorists worry about-they do 
not exist now, but could in the future. They have no rights-how could they? Just as cur­
rent students are not graduates of Cal Poly, but are potential graduates-and so they have 
no right to represent themselves (e.g., to employers) as graduates now. If all goes well, 
they will have those rights at a later time-but they do not have them now. And so with 
any other potentiality-future persons have no rights now. But that does not (pace Kant) 
guarantee that we (current) persons have no obligations towards them. 
The problematic nature of rights theory and Kantian ethics for sustainability revolves 
around clarifying just such issues. Take Jane Doe, a hypothetical 25 year old, normally 
functioning citizen ofthe year 2100. As a merely potential (future) person here in 2004, 
she has no rights now-how could she? She does not even have the right to exist, we 
assume; her hypothetical great-grandparents here and now do no wrong in choosing 
not to have a child, in which case she never will exist. But in the year 2100, as an actual 
person, she certainly will have rights-so she potentially, but not actually, has rights now. 
What are my obligations, here in 2004, towards her-and her environment? Do I have a 
responsibility to avoid global warming or asteroid strikes or nuclear fallout polluting 
her environment or even making it unliveable? If so, we cannot say it is because she has 
a right now that specifies my duty. Yet we do believe that causing e.g. massive pollution 
or crop failure or intense radioactive fallout of future habitations or enormously 
adversely affecting other aspects of sustainability is deeply wrong. We cannot specify 
that wrongness in terms of current rights, or even in the interests or cares of current 
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rights holders. A Kantian or rights approach simply will not work. How then do we 
specify adequate and coherent moral thought about sustainability? 
2. Sustainability, utilitarianism and intergenerational ethics 
Given the failures of rights talk, a popular attempt to resolve our duties to the future is 
to embrace some form of utilitarianism-the initially plausible idea that morality is 
about producing the best possible consequences, understood as maximizing utility-the 
net result of summing the good consequences of our actions and subtracting the bad. 
Put baldly, ethics utilitarian-style is about the ends justifying the means; it simply claims 
that what defines the moral is whatever produces the best possible future-an approach 
superficially amenable to discussion of sustainability. Indeed, the issues of sustainabili­
ty are often characterized in utilitarian terms; for instance, the concept of a 'Triple Bot­
tom Line': in cost-benefit terms, the economic, environmental and social value our 
activities add-and destroy. 
In economics, 'sustainable growth' is standardly defined as the growth of real (infla­
tion-adjusted) income that could be sustained indefinitely. On the other hand, environ­
mental or ecological sustainability is oft opposed to economic: it is usuaUy driven by a 
perception that the quality of the environment is negatively correlated with economic 
development, and this cannot continue indefinitely, lest we all perish in the wastes of 
our own affluence. Using some utilitarian calculus to attempt to escape this apparent 
dilemma drives the analysis of sustainability in terms of the 'triple bottom line'. Broad­
ly, this approach is supposed to capture the whole set of values, issues and processes that 
society, especially business, must address in order to minimize any harm resulting from 
their activities and to create and maximize the net result (or "profit") of the three 'bot­
tom lines' of economic, social and environmental value. For business, this involves the 
notion of responsibility being to the company's stakeholders-aU those affected by its 
activities-including the shareholders, but also customers, employees, business partners, 
governments, local communities and the public. Society depends on the economy-and 
the economy depends on the global ecosystem, whose health is the acknowledged pre­
requisite for the other two. This utilitarian version of the triple bottom line then simply 
asks: how can we playoff competing costs of sustaining one versus the others, so as to 
maximize 'net human preferences'? The pious hope has been that perhaps this cost-ben­
efit utilitarianism, beloved of government, business, and social planners, can solve the 
problem of our responsibilities towards Jane Doe and her environment. 
Or perhaps not. A contemporary utilitarian with great influence on these issues is 
Peter Singer, now of Princeton University. He rejects the economic form of utilitarian­
ism advocated by some libertarians and other free marketers. That idea views utility as 
equivalent to consumer net preferences, so the way to maximize utility is to maximize 
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consumer preferences; an un trammelled free market in which everyone has the liberty 
to buy or sell anything they own for any price mutually agreed upon hence maximizes 
the economic preferences of the greatest number. This 'economic utilitarianism' hews 10 
a libertarian line that recognizes property and the right to sell or buy it as the only pos­
itive rights. The problems with this begin (but hardly end) with those who are devoid 
of property but still need food, shelter, etc.-the poor. 
To avoid this problem, Singer follows a 'radical economist' line of stating that there 
are certain preferences which must be important for everyone, even if the individuals 
involved might not think so-food and shelter highest among them. So we must find 
food and shelter for the greatest number of people possible, and after that, other pref­
erences in similar utilitarian fashion. Singer's view further claims that sentience (the 
ability to experience pleasure/pain) is the key moral attribute, and all sentient creatures 
should be treated in utilitarian fashion-more or less, we ought to maximize pleasure 
and minimize pain for all sentient creatures. To a first approximation, morality thus 
involves minimizing sentient suffering-suffering is only permissible when it produces 
greater net pleasure in the long run. This view, alas for Singer, leads to reductio ad absur­
dum. 
Singer's utilitarianism implies that animal experimentation or consumption is 
wrong except in a case in which we would be willing to experiment on or consume a 
human with similar capabilities (sentience) to the animal. But, taken seriously, this view 
undermines environmentalism (and indeed all ethics!) as usually understood. Our 
human obligation then is to minimize total suffering, which means that 'wild animals' 
are most certainly NOT to be left to their own devices, with nature red in tooth and claw. 
No one disputes wild cats and dogs/wolves endure far more suffering than domesticat­
ed ones, and so the human obligation to avoid suffering implies immediately that we 
should domesticate as many species as possible. Further, a great deal of suffering occurs 
in the context of hunting and killing associated with meat eating, so it makes sense that 
we should not merely become vegetarians, but indeed should (as painlessly as possible!) 
sterilize and even euthanize all predators and carnivores, so that we drive them to 
extinction. Animal suffering would surely be alleviated in a world in which only peace­
ful herbivores exist. 
But in truth, for Singer we ought not stop there. The insects certainly behave as if 
they register pain, and self-conscious mental states are unnecessary for suffering on 
Singer's view... so it appears crystal clear that the untold billions or even trillions of 
numbers of insects, including termites and roaches, are far more morally considerable 
than the entirety of the animal kingdom. A million roaches would certainly be more 
valuable, in terms of sentience, than a human life. Indeed, a moral view would logically 
bid all ecological niches occupied by animals be vacated as well, so that the far more 
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numerous insects could occupy them without suffering. Even the predatory insects 
should be extinguished, leaving only bees and their ilk. Hence, a world with only insect 
and plant life would have far less suffering, and all animals hence should be (again, as 
painlessly as possible!) driven to extinction. The culmination of ethical obligation is to 
remove all creatures capable of it! 
3. So utilitarianism is wrong - what then for sustainability? 
For the treatment of humans Singer pretty well believes we have a duty to minimize the 
suffering of others around the world, even at potential considerable cost to ourselves. Tn 
particular, we have a responsibility to feed every starving person, as long as we have 
more than enough food ourselves, etc. So for Singer, famine relief goes not nearly far 
enough. Expropriation of wealth on a large scale from First to Third World is morally 
mandated. In my view, Singer does not go nearly far enough in understanding that peo­
ple's preferences need to be re-educated, nor does he fully acknowledge the horrible cor­
ruption of advertising in this regard. In general, the role of education in changing both 
preferences and the social and cultural as well as material basis for developing prefer­
ences is obscured by such analyses, which reduce our responsibilities to a utilitarian cal­
culation of how many starving people we can feed while still getting our jollies 
elsewhere. 
For an instructive contrast, in the late 1960s a philosopher named Garrett Hardin 
publicized the so-called 'tragedy of the commons' as an illustration of a general prob­
lem called the prisoner's dilemma, in which the action that is collectively rational for a 
group does not map onto what is individually rational for each person involved. 
Hardin's example was medieval English common land, which, with no private owner­
ship, suffered from overgrazing, to the eventual ruin of all involved. This ruin occurred 
because the benefits that each extra cow brings were reaped solely by its owner, but the 
costs of the extra strain it put on the grass (and water, etc.) were shared among all the 
users of what is held in common. In economic jargon, the costs were externalized-not 
borne by the producers of the product, but by others. There is never an economic incen­
tive to internalize external costs. So everyone selfishly had an incentive to raise as many 
cattle as possible, although they knew if everyone did as they did, it would ruin every­
one. But voluntarily refraining from use simply puts you at a competitive disadvantage 
with someone who selfishly grazes more. So individually rational behavior deteriorates 
into collective ruin. Solutions, claim Hardin, are privatization or more likely mutual 
coercion, mutually agreed upon-as air, e.g., can't be privatized. So, Hardin believes that 
the government must simply pass and enforce laws to coerce people to act in their own 
long-term interest, even when some suffer as a result. In a sense, this amounts to a kind 
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of longer-term utilitarianism, in which numerous humans are sacrificed at present to 
save more later on-or to prevent many would-be miserable ones from ever being born. 
Hardin generalized this approach for the sustainability of the whole biosphere, espe­
cially as regards human overpopulation, in his "Lifeboat Ethics." He asserts that feeding 
the starving when such practices are unsustainable is unjustified. In particular, if we feed 
people and they reproduce and their children starve and we feed them... We cannot do 
so forever, and sooner or later everyone will be starving-i.e., Malthus was right. As one 
commentator put it, 
It is moral to haul shipwrecked swimmers out of the water until one more 
swimmer sinks the whole boat. The answer to how many swimmers we 
can save is a scientific question. Thus, scientific morals. 
Of course, it's not that simple. A better commentary follows rules drawn from 
Hardin's work: 
(1) An acceptable system of ethics is contingent on its ability to preserve 
the ecosystems which sustain it. 
(2) Biological necessity has a veto over the behavior which any set of 
moral beliefs can allow or require. 
(3) Biological success is a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition for 
any acceptable ethical theory. In summary, no ethics can be grounded in 
biological impossibility; no ethics can be incoherent in that it requires eth­
ical behavior that ends all further ethical behavior. Clearly any ethics 
which tries to do so is mistaken; it is wrong. 
I believe that these last three laws are basically correct, with some caveats as to word­
ing. But they don't validly generate the conclusion that we must allow millions of peo­
ple to starve because at present we don't know how to create a sustainable economy for 
their area. But of course, Singer's utilitarianism is misguided too-as seen, it flagrantly 
violates the third law. Both Hardin and Singer fail sufficiently to appreciate how tech­
nology and human cooperation can change the nature of the game. The 'demographic 
transition' that occurs as literacy levels and other indicators move form a Third to First 
World has always included a drop in birthrate, largely coincident with but lagging 
behind (by 30-50 years) a drop in death rate. So populations boom for a while as health 
care and food production get better and people live longer, then stabilize as birth rates 
fall. I believe that the necessary conditions for such a transition are predicated on high 
literacy and other education, the emancipation of women from solely traditional child­
bearing roles into active social/work life, and expectations of reasonable health and 
longevity for oneself and one's children. So I think the first focus of responsibility 
around the world is to create such conditions everywhere. They are prerequisites for 
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long-term sustainability and quality of life, and thus inculcating such virtues trumps 
trying to save every single starving person. 
We need a rich tapestry of the virtues that constitute the highest form of human life, 
and to educate people into seeing their value, instead of simply allowing market forces 
and advertising to pervert the values and preferences of the masses into short-term pris­
oner's dilemmas. Virtue ethics, rather than utilitarianism, hence guides inquiry into 
future obligations. It helps us realize that such values as conduce to human flourishing 
are virtues, which will be self-authenticating-they will be the preferences people have 
under conditions offree and informed inquiry, the values of a self-sustaining and self-cor­
recting society. They will always have the truth as their overarching goal, not the maxi­
mization of profit or any other lesser end. 
Effecting this transition to an entire society which values the truth about everything, 
from how much to consume to how much to read to how much to give to famine relief, 
crucially depends on our ability to apply our education; that is, it depends on technol­
ogy, and new technology changes what is 'sustainable'. And so it makes perfect sense, 
e.g., to save as many lives as possible in a truly transitioning economy, because even if 
their lives are unsustainable under conditions *at present*, *if* the transition continues, 
their lives will become sustainable in the future. So it becomes a matter of priorities: to 
a first approximation, we should save as many starving people as possible, *as long as* 
they could also be given health care and educated to an awareness of the basics of free 
inquiry, self-government and democratic rule with resources available. 
And so J hold that our primary duty to any future Jane Doe is to assure that she will 
be born into a society with those values. Because, in short, one can defeat prisoner's 
dilemmas with education-one can get people to see what is selfishly rational is collec­
tively irrational, and in the end, will bring them down too. Prisoner's dilemmas only 
work when people don't understand the difference between collective and individual 
(selfish) rationality-when they do not know how to reach a sustainable consensus, to 
inculcate the virtues that lead to flourishing in lived society. Inculcating those values, 
rather than any narrow short-term calculus of economic profit versus ecological costs, 
or a misguided emphasis on the impossible ascription of "rights" to the environment, 
will lead to the eventual solution to the problem of specifying our duties for sustain­
ability. That is the real 'triple bottom line'. (; 
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